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ABSTRACT
Evidence affirms that aesthetic engagement patterns our movements, 
often with us barely aware. This invites an examination of pre-reflective 
engagement within cities and also aesthetic experience as a form of the 
pre-reflective. The invitation is amplified because design has political 
implications. For instance, it can draw people in or exclude them by 
establishing implicitly recognized public-private boundaries. The Value 
Sensitive Design school, which holds that artifacts embody ethical and 
political values, stresses some of this. But while emphasizing that design 
embodies implicit values, research in this field lacks sustained attention 
to largely unconscious background biases or values, rooted in cultural 
attitudes and personal interests, that lead theorists and planners—
often too narrowly—to promote design organized around specific 
values such as defensibility. In examining these points, I draw on J. J. 
Gibson, a central figure for some writing on aesthetics and cities, and 
whom pragmatists and phenomenologists in turn influenced. Taking 
a cue from pragmatists in particular, I argue that Gibson’s perceptual 
theory of affordances entails a theory of values, meaning our perception 
and therewith movements are inherently value-based. I advocate 
design that accounts for relatively constantly held values such as safety, 
while also handling the vast pluralism that exists and not crushing the 
aesthetic vibrancy of city life.
I. Introduction
Scholars from philosophy, psychology and urban studies have argued that life unfolds 
with relatively little reflection, yet nonetheless intelligently, with classical phenomenolo-
gists especially known for this view.1 A growing number of scholars, ranging from Mark 
Johnson and Jesse Prinz to Jay Schulkin, also maintain that aesthetic experience is at the 
root of most of our engagements. As Schulkin, a neuroscientist and commentator on prag-
matic philosophy, notes: “Information-processing systems,” which are not separate from 
emotional capacities, “pervade aesthetic judgment; our representational capacity, the play 
and flexibility of cognitive systems, the detection of discrepancy—all are reflective of our 
aesthetic judgments.”2 The environmental psychologists Rachel and Stephen Kaplan repeat 
the idea, and wed it to the opening point by building on J. J. Gibson’s theory of affordances, 
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proposing that aesthetic experience originates in rapid and unconscious appraisals of how 
we can act in different settings.3
Evidence—not to mention common sense—affirms that aesthetic contact with the world 
shapes patterns of movement, so that urban landscapes can repulse or draw in and do 
considerably more, often with people barely aware of influences guiding them. This invites 
an examination of pre-reflective engagement within cities and also aesthetic experience 
as a mode of the pre-reflective. The invitation is made more pressing because movement 
within urban settings is political, albeit sometimes subtly. To cite an extreme example, 
more than one commentator has argued that New York City planner Robert Moses placed 
low overpasses strategically to impede bus transportation from poor and especially black 
neighborhoods to Jones Beach.4 There are also documented cases of design facilitating 
or thwarting political protests.5 Value Sensitive Design schools, which hold that artifacts 
embody ethical and political outlooks, stress just these points; and the relative newness of 
the field highlights that the value-ladeness of design has historically gone mostly unnoticed, 
which in turn emphasizes the opening claim: that everyday life unfolds with relatively little 
reflection, yet nonetheless intelligently.
In advancing the case laid out above, and specifically arguing that Gibson’s theory of affor-
dances implies a theory of values, I review and defend the accounts of Jane Jacobs, William 
Whyte and the Kaplans, which I think remain largely legitimate today. I connect their work 
to Value Sensitive Design research, and also to pragmatists and phenomenologists, who are 
in the historical lineage via Gibson leading to the Kaplans, even if the latter are unaware of 
it, with pragmatists especially emphasizing that we register nearly everything in terms of 
values. As with most writers on urban design, I want to promote livable spaces. This means 
spaces that are not overly shaped by the values of one group or historical context, yet also 
not so undefined as to generate chaos. I focus on social implications of design and aesthet-
ics: how they can establish implicitly recognized public-private boundaries and permeable 
transitions zones, cultivate contrasting patterns of human contact, and affect everything 
from security to social inclusiveness to the overall vibrancy of cities.
II. Pre-reflective life
During the Modern era a growing number of authors, such as Nietzsche and Freud, began 
to speculate that much of psychic life occurs below or just at the limits of consciousness.6 
Experimental psychologists have likewise suggested that human consciousness is limited. 
People can keep only a small number of things in mind at a given moment—between 
five and nine items is established as typical,7 though the number may be less.8 Numerous 
researchers hold that consciousness, in psychoanalytic language, is just the tip of the ice-
berg. In the admittedly problematic parlance of cognitive psychology, this translates to 
the bulk of information processing transpiring automatically, with little or no reflective 
thought. “Categorization, assumption, and inference often occur without awareness,”9 and 
“[a] considerable amount of evidence indicates that as compared with consciously controlled 
cognition, the nonconscious information-acquisition processes are incomparably faster and 
structurally more sophisticated.”10
Some cognitive psychologists describe two parallel, interacting modes of human informa-
tion processing: an explicit, predominantly rational mode, and an implicit, more emotionally 
driven mode,11 which, “[r]esearch on animals, brain damaged-patients, and neuroimaging 
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studies of healthy subjects” show “can be dissociated from each other functionally and 
anatomically.”12 The explicit mode—what Seymour Epstein calls the “rational” mode13—is 
analytical, abstract, verbal, deliberative and relatively affect-free. It deals more with declar-
ative than procedural knowledge, and involves more thinking than doing. It often comes 
into play when people are confronted with something new or attempting to figure their 
way through some unexpected and novel situation. The implicit, or what Epstein calls the 
“experiential” mode, by comparison, is more intuitive, automatic, non-verbal and intimately 
associated with affect, though not exclusive of non-affective cognition. When considering 
the implicit mode one does well to think about life in the everyday world—the world, as 
Edmund Husserl put it, “that is actually given through perception, that is ever experienced 
and experienceable—our everyday life-world.”14 As a more emotionally driven form of 
engagement, the implicit mode includes “gut-responses,” nearly instant appraisals, actions 
impulsively taken. It also encompasses cognitive heuristics and schemas, that is, ingrained 
and implicit patterns of thinking and doing, with tacit assumptions that lead to nearly instant 
judgments. Relative to the explicit mode, implicit engagement is more effortless and rapid, 
though sometimes at the cost of flexibility. It is nearly always in play, even in tasks judged 
to be the pinnacle of human intelligence: master chess players, composers and surgeons 
“report automatic processing ... and feel they operate without conscious thinking.”15
An alternative account, though one that arrives at the same conclusion, is developed by 
thinkers believing that a great deal of perception and cognition is constituted through bodily 
actions, which are, almost by definition, pre-reflective. John Dewey, Maurice Merleau-Ponty 
and to a lesser extent Martin Heidegger are all advocates of this view as are contemporary 
figures working in embodied cognition such as Andy Clark, Anthony Chemero, Shaun 
Gallagher, Alva Noë and Evan Thompson, who are, to varying degrees, influenced by prag-
matic and phenomenological traditions. These scholars suggest that active bodies are com-
parable to Kant’s a priori insofar as they underlie integrative and in some cases calculative 
tasks, as when the knee processes complex problems of physics when walking,16 so that, as 
Clark put it, many “computational … operations are implemented” through bodily action, 
suggesting “operations are not in the neural system alone but in the whole embodied system 
located in the world.”17 World-body interactions also structure experience. Merleau-Ponty 
explains, for instance, that “[s]moothness is not a collection of similar pressures,” that is, it is 
not merely an aggregate of sensations received by and integrated in the brain; it is also “the 
way in which a surface utilizes the time occupied by our tactile exploration or modulates the 
movement of our hand”18 and thereby gives form to experience. Thus, Merleau-Ponty adds 
more generally, “consciousness”—or perhaps more properly, the structures underlying it, 
“is in the first place not a matter of ‘I think that’ but of ‘I can.’”19 Dewey offers an essentially 
identical account in the pragmatic tradition.20
On this bodily understanding, the cognitive or Freudian unconscious finds its analogue 
in what Dewey calls “deep-seated habits or organic ‘memories,’”21 or what Heidegger thought 
of as readiness-to-hand.22 In line with accounts from cognitive psychology, however, this 
does not imply unintelligent, reflexivities. Rather, “in contrast to the stimulus-response 
argument of the behaviorist perspective,” as David Seamon elucidates, echoing Merleau-
Ponty, pre-reflective doings are “not a chain of discrete passive responses to external stim-
uli;” instead, “the body holds within itself an active, intentional holistic capacity which 
intimately ‘knows’ through action the everyday environments and spaces in which the 
person lives.”23 With smartphones, for example, our hands’ practical know-how cannot be 
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merely a conditioned, mechanical response. If it were, then adjusting to a phone or tablet 
of a different size would be nearly impossible.24 Seen accordingly, practical know-how of 
smartphones is an intelligent, embodied understanding of how to negotiate a world of digital 
devices—one that occurs not necessarily without awareness, but pre-conceptually and in 
this sense pre-reflectively. Accordingly, most only “know” the keyboard in use, and could 
not draw a diagram of its layout from memory, and we only tend to encounter the phone 
as a detached objective or conceptual object when it is not working properly.25
Smartphones are just one case among many, and what holds here applies to urban life, 
albeit more so. It applies more because urban life is thoroughly embodied. Cities and archi-
tecture are, as it were, art we can move through, participate with and change. They are sites 
of daily, habitual attitudes and activities, or what Jacobs calls street ballets. In the words 
of Johnson, accordingly, architecture and urban settings are “beautifully situated right at 
the heart of [the] organism-environment transaction.” They are “spatial and bodily, and so 
[they emerge] from and [draw] on our pre-reflective bodily engagement with the physical 
dimensions of place and space.”26
III. Movement and pre-reflective life
Two points emerge from the discussion so far. One is that everyday life is predominantly 
pre-reflective, meaning we do things with little conscious awareness. Indeed, evidence sug-
gests we are often unaware of even our preferences, with Whyte remarking: “How many 
people would say they like to sit in the middle of a crowd? Instead, they speak of getting 
away from it all, and use terms like ‘escape,’ ‘oasis,’ ‘retreat.’ What people do, however, reveals 
a different priority.”27 A second point is that perception is linked to movement. This follows 
obviously from the fact that we use perceptive faculties to navigate. It also follows from 
embodied cognitive science, which is influenced by the thought of Gibson, who was, in turn, 
influenced by pragmatists and phenomenologists.28 Gibson and his intellectual ancestors 
and offspring argue that we see things in terms of what it is possible to do or what he called 
“affordances,”29 and, indeed, if we did not see walls as obstacles, hallways as traversable, 
rivers as dangerous or navigable, we would be functionally blind.
Emphasizing all of these ideas, the Kaplans propose that aesthetic appraisals reflect “a 
very rapid (albeit unconscious) assessment of what it is possible to do in [a] setting,”30 while 
Stephen Kaplan, referencing Gibson in particular, concludes aesthetic perception falls within 
what Gibson called affordances.31 Thus while aesthetics tends to be undervalued—with many 
regarding aesthetically pleasing design as desirable but ultimately dispensable—aesthetic 
experience, as something that undergirds perception itself, “is not the reflection of a whim 
that people exercise when they are not otherwise occupied.” It appears rather “to constitute 
a guide to human behavior that has far-reaching consequences,”32 and one that occurs with 
rapid unobtrusiveness that often leaves us unaware we are making judgments. The phe-
nomenon is comparable to “[t]he rapid intuitive evaluation by people of other people.”33
Stephen Kaplan’s background in computer sciences, i.e., information theory, influences 
the Kaplans’ views on aesthetics. Though cautioning that their “version of…information-pro-
cessing ... in many respects is different from the way computers process information,”34 the 
two versions are similar in one important regard: both make a conceptual link between 
“information” and “uncertainty.” In this way the Kaplans follow information theory a com-
putational model, first proposed by Claude Shannon in 1949, that mathematically equates 
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information to uncertainty. Here more complex and hence larger bundles of information 
are said to involve greater amounts of uncertainty. Hence, as Warren Weaver explains, 
“bits,” the basic binary units in computing, are mathematically equivalent to the number of 
yes-no questions one would need to ask in order to determine the answer to a question.35
Uncertainty enters the Kaplans’ aesthetic research because, for example, in the same way 
that some works of art have an ambiguous quality that pulls audiences into them, some set-
tings have an enticing uncertainty that draws people to penetrate deeper. Some of their exper-
iments show that people are especially tempted by settings with trails disappearing around 
bends or with well-lit clearings partially occluded by intervening foliage. They characterize 
these scenes as having a sense of “mystery”—an allure that comes of things being partially 
hidden.36 These mysterious settings are preferred over highly occluded ones that give little 
hint of what lies out of view, but also over open scenes that leave nothing to the imagination. 
“Mystery,” as described by the Kaplans, “involves not the presence of new information, but 
its promise”37—a promise only actualized, however, through further movement. Here “there 
is partially hidden information, and something in the scene tempts one to explore further.”38 
Some Japanese gardens employ this principle. The view is never completely obstructed, yet 
never completely open. No matter where one stands, one can never see the entire garden. 
With something always left uncertain and hidden beyond the next bend, one is continually 
drawn further through the setting. As part of daily exploratory activity, such behavior can 
be characterized as habitual, and it occurs more as an emotional pull than a reflective deci-
sion to reduce uncertainty. In the Kaplans’ words, preference “is generally not the result of 
conscious calculation. In fact, people are often willing to indicate their preferences based on 
the briefest glimpse, permitting no opportunity for careful reflection.”39 Despite the clunky 
cognitive language, the Kaplans’ picture characterizes the everyday phenomenology of city 
life where we are enticed by narrow streets with gentle curves, or places where vendors are 
set up, not just because we are interested in wares, but also because we wish to see what is 
being sold, which is to say, discover what is currently out of view.
While ambiguity is important, so too is definition, which can attract but also lead people 
to pause. The phenomenon is well known in everyday life, as when we are pulled to a corner 
table at a restaurant, as if seeking shelter; and it applies to urban spaces as well where peo-
ple “show an inclination to station themselves near objects, such as a flagpole or a statue.” 
“They like”—and slow to dwell at—“well-defined places, such as steps, or the border of a 
pool.”40 Jacobs makes just this point too, adding, however, that perimeters should be “spots 
of intense and magnetic border activity,”41 not hard boundaries. She proposes amenities that 
amplify activity around perimeters, along with measures to draw cross-border movement, 
for example, a skating rink at the periphery and a café across the street where skaters can 
get refreshments and watchers observe the skaters. She suggests other features that inten-
sify activity around borders—for instance, checker pavilions along the perimeter of a park. 
Quoting Kevin Lynch, Jacobs asserts that a border can be “a seam rather than a barrier, a 
line of exchange along which two areas are sewn together.”42 Thus while enclosure serves 
aesthetic and functional purposes, borders in public spaces benefit from a certain amount 
of ambiguity and permeability, as the Kaplans also suggest. Also agreeing with their views 
is that aesthetic perception of settings forms around what we can do in them and what they 
invite us to do, meaning experience coheres around action.
The Kaplans accordingly argue that features giving definition to a space, and therewith 
shaping possibilities of movement, often increase its attractiveness, yet only to a point: 
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overly strong boundaries are not generally preferred. Arnold Berleant expresses the same 
principle when he describes how some plazas, parks and buildings “confront us with solid, 
opposing planes” that repel, whereas others are “participatory”; they “encourage entry; 
they ... evoke our interest and draw us in.”43 Berleant adds that the invitation to participate 
is nowhere “more pronounced than in the case of entrances, doorways, and stairs. They 
can put one off or lead one in.”44 This too can be grasped in terms of uncertainty and tacit 
or pre-reflective invitations to movement, for Whyte observes that popular plazas tend to 
have permeable borders—or, as he put it, a “cordial relation with the street”45 that inspires 
entry. The porous border of New York City’s Paley Park, for instance, “stimulates impulse 
use. Many people will do a double take as they pass by, pause, move a few steps, then, with 
slight acceleration, go up the steps.” According to Whyte, this is partly explained by the fact 
that “[t]he steps at Paley are so low and easy that one is almost pulled to them. They add a 
nice ambiguity to your movement. You can stand and watch, move up a foot, another, then, 
without having made a conscious decision, find yourself in the park.”46
If our pre-reflective consciousness of the world is more a matter of “I can” than “I 
think,” as Merleau-Ponty suggests; or, as Johnson says in a mix of Deweyan and Gibsonian 
language, if things and settings are experienced as “clusters of affordances of possible 
interactions we have had, or might have,”47 then it is easy to see why a slight elevation 
and run of stairs beckons people, whereas usage falls with increases in height and the 
addition of other features that more definitively separate the space from abutting streets 
and sidewalks. Slight variations have large impacts. Whyte points out “[o]ne plaza that 
people could be expected to use, but don’t, is only a foot or two higher than two com-
parable ones nearby.” Although the difference is slight, the plaza “seems much higher. 
The steps are constricted in width, sharply defined by railings, and their pitch is brisk. 
No ambiguity here; no dawdling; no drifting up.”48 Of course, other factors are at play, 
so that the low sweep of stairs and porous border of Paley would not draw in people if a 
cesspool were the centerpiece. While this is so, it is also the case that “[m]agnificent views 
and handsome landscaping fail to operate as demand goods; maybe these ‘should,’ but 
demonstrably they do not. They can work as adjuncts only.”49 Urban aesthetics is about 
more than just sheer beauty.
An additional line of thought emphasizing the pre-reflective—and one less cognitivist 
than that advanced by the Kaplans—comes from the observation that we spend much of our 
time in practical, habitual modes of engagement, what Heidegger terms “readiness-to-hand.” 
Smartphone keyboards, for example, which most only know in use and could not draw from 
memory, are an example. This phenomenon manifests too in urban life. Jacobs describes 
the situation when discussing everyday rituals she observed and participated in during her 
time in Greenwich Village:
The stretch of Hudson Street where I live is each day the scene of an intricate sidewalk ballet. 
I make my own first entrance into it a little after eight when I put out the garbage can, surely 
a prosaic occupation, but I enjoy my part, my little clang, as the droves of junior high school 
students walk by the center of the stage dropping candy wrappers. […]
While I sweep up the candy wrappers I watch the other rituals of the morning: Mr. Halpert 
unlocking the laundry’s handcart from its mooring to a cellar door, Joe Cornacchia’s son-in-law 
stacking out the empty crates from the delicatessen, the barber bringing out his sidewalk folding 
chair, Mr. Goldstein arranging the coils of wire which proclaim the hardware store is open.50
Jacobs goes on to describe a variety of other morning rituals. Then, she writes,
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It is time for me to go to work too, and I exchange my ritual farewell with Mr. Lofaro, the 
short, thick-bodied, white-aproned fruit man who stands outside his doorway a little up the 
street… We nod; we each glance up and down the street, then look back to each other and 
smile. We have done this many a morning for more than ten years, and we both know what 
it means: All is well.51
Paraphrasing Jacobs, Seamon described the “habitual, routine qualities” of this street ballet 
as “an unselfconscious context for informal, regular interactions of residents and users.”52
This ballet, which is just one of many urban dances, has the flow of a stream, with its gur-
gle and occasional hubbub, and like a stream it can range from soothing to threatening. As 
with dances, it cannot be fluidly enacted if not subsumed in daily habits, that is, responsive 
and evolving routines that occur with awareness but little reflection. Over time, Seamon 
explains, interactions mature into a sense of community—or, as Jacobs puts it, “a web of 
public respect and trust”53—that bestow definition and a feeling of place. A locale then 
becomes a place we inhabit, not in the sense of physically living there, but in the sense that 
we are at home. This can, but does not always, include a house, and can equally encompass 
a neighborhood, park or favorite sidewalk.
IV. Design, affordances and values
The notion of “affordances” owes an intellectual debt to pragmatism, with one of William 
James’s students, Henry Holt, teaching Gibson,54 and Gibson’s theory relating to the pragma-
tist claim, especially emphasized by James, that we cannot think in the absence of interests. 
With a little extrapolation, this suggests that we cannot perceive without them either. In 
the case of a river, we might perceive a barrier, perhaps something drinkable, navigable, 
cooling, freezing or treacherous, which means in terms of actions we might take and their 
effects on us, and hence in terms of use-value and consequently interests. This illustrates 
how affordances can loosely be understood as values. In turn, this understanding suggests 
Gibson’s account, and those it has influenced, ought to be taken as an intellectual precursor 
to Value Sensitive Design, an approach accounting “for human values in a principled and 
comprehensive manner throughout the design process.”55
Though not originally focused on architecture and urban design, theorists have begun 
applying it to the field. Jeroen van den Hoven, for example, notes that garden cities of the 
early twentieth century reflect the value that low-income families are entitled to green 
spaces,56 and Rajiv Shah and Jay Kesan observe that marble in financial institutions sig-
nifies a value placed on trust, reliability and security.57 Other features embody the value 
of defensiveness or exclusivity. So in the same way that spaces may repel entry through 
strong, unambiguous delineation, as discussed by Berleant and Whyte, they may also do 
so by expressing hostility towards the surrounding environment. Edmund Bacon and more 
recently van den Hoven talk about target hardening in fortresses, which exemplifies the 
point. The bases of such structures are “completely dominated by the need to resist the hostile 
environment outside.” There are limited entrances, no windows, rugged surfaces designed 
to deflect missiles and “inward-looking convex forms [to] produce the minimum surface 
exposure for the maximum interior volume.”58 At higher levels where the risk of intrusion 
is less, the design is more delicate and open to the surrounding space.
Non-physical barriers or affordances can have similar effects. The notion of affordance—
that is, the idea that we perceive the world in terms of how we can move and handle things 
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and the ease with which we can do so—accordingly applies not only to physical restraints; it 
operates also on a symbolic level, and so understood, Bacon’s remarks have implications for 
the design of public spaces. For instance, the Harold Washington Library Center in Chicago, 
a public building, is modeled in a Renaissance style recalling the Medici-Riccardi Palace 
in Florence, a private structure that was designed to repel outside intrusion. As with the 
palace, the library has a fortified appearance at street level where its windows are small and 
its masonry rough. Higher up its appearance is less defensible, with gigantic windows and 
delicate masonry. The small elegant brass doors are dwarfed by the building, and resemble 
the entrance to an exclusive hotel. One doubts whether users feel pulled into this building 
in the manner described by Whyte and Berleant. Intended or not, this building affords 
values contrary to its public use.
While arguably employed inappropriately in this instance, some theorists—including 
Jacobs but more prominently Oscar Newman—have argued that such design features can 
be put to good use. Newman, in his landmark book Defensible Space, proposed a model of 
urban design that inhibits crime by cultivating “an environment in which latent”—or one 
might say pre-reflective—”territoriality and sense of community ... can be translated into ... a 
safe, well-maintained living space.”59 Newman, who is criticized today,60 yet also taken seri-
ously,61 and who was interestingly exposed to if not influenced by Heidegger and Merleau-
Ponty,62 claims that many inner-city housing projects are vulnerable to criminal intruders 
because non-residents can approach with little feeling of entering into privately controlled 
territory. For example, one development consisted “of large high-rise slabs sited on grounds 
intentionally left open for use by both the resident population and the surrounding commu-
nity. Each building [was] entered directly from the public grounds.”63 With no intermediary 
zones marking the transition from public to private territory, residents are less likely to spot 
potential intruders and feel entitled to question them. Newman suggests amending this by 
incorporating markers—or what are in practice symbolic affordances—that communicate 
the progression into increasingly private space such as a curb or decorative fence, followed 
by a lawn with a walkway leading to a lobby. A stranger moving through these zones will 
feel increasingly conspicuous and be increasingly pronounced to inhabitants and subject to 
their questions. “Design can make ... both inhabitant and stranger ... perceive that an area 
is under the undisputed influence of a particular group.”64
Developed social networks can do the same. Thus while crime sometimes increases 
with the height of the building in low-income neighborhoods,65 Newman argues that “for 
low-income elderly, the high-rise apartment building seems to work very well indeed.”66 As 
a contrasting case, he discusses a study showing that smaller, older dormitories, with narrow 
corridors and a limited number of entrances, cultivate a stronger sense of community than 
a newer, massive structure with a large entrance. In the newer dorms, students were said 
to almost universally adopt a “loner” attitude, and incidents of drug use and vandalism 
were much higher.67 Accordingly, while the homogeneity of the residents in retirement 
apartments makes strangers more salient, this does not seem to be enough since the newer 
dorm also had a homogeneous population. It could be that the average criminal is not 
elderly, making him or her stand out in senior populations; or that seniors are less likely to 
vandalize, either because of cultural factors related to age or because their residency is less 
transitory than dormitory students; yet Newman also reasons that social networks defend 
residents. “Because the elderly are, for the most part, retired and as a result have much free 
time on their hands, they tend to socialize a lot”;68 they come to look out for one another, 
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and because “[i]t is quite common for a group to spontaneously set up a table at the entry 
to their buildings[…], they effectively serve as their own doormen.”69
However, surveillance does not inevitably translate into intervention. Jacobs, again 
emphasizing the pre-reflective, writes that without a background awareness of “the almost 
unconscious reassurance of general street support in upholding civilization,” surveillance 
does little. “Horrifying public crimes can, and do, occur in well-lighted subway stations 
when no effective eyes are present. They virtually never occur in darkened theaters where 
many people and eyes are present.”70 Newman identifies two interrelated features that should 
be present for surveillance to be effective: a sense of proprietorship and community. An 
observer’s willingness to intervene depends on “[t]he extent to which the activity observed 
is understood to be occurring in an area within the sphere of influence of the observer.” It 
also depends on “[t]he observer’s identification with either the victim or the property being 
vandalized or stolen.”71 Hence the extension of proprietorship is not merely psychological; it 
involves creating and defining social space and indeed social affordances, fostering a habitual 
understanding of where one can go, what one can do and when one can intervene. Newman 
proposes that reducing vehicular traffic through a residential area makes it more pleasant 
and safer for children, thereby drawing families into sidewalks, while making outsiders 
more conspicuous and altering the area into a place where residents have proprietorship.72 
Providing spaces for gardening can do the same. The added beauty brings still others out, 
and the increased aesthetic appeal of the space increases residents’ attachment to it and 
consequently their proprietorship, all regarded as essential by Newman for safe urban liv-
ing. In more phenomenological language, cultivating a garden and the care that goes into 
it, seeing it grow—all this may transform a house into a home, a place where people dwell, 
incorporate themselves and indeed become part of the place that is part of them.
Newman acknowledges the influence of Jacobs’ The Death and Life of Great American 
Cities, written roughly 10 years before his major book, and his work and hers agree on a 
range of points. Yet they also differ markedly. Newman attends almost exclusively to resi-
dential design. Jacobs rejects the notion that residential and commercial spheres should be 
separated. Newman aims to diminish outside human traffic and make strangers feel foreign 
and increase their conspicuousness to residents. Jacobs insists that neighborhoods can 
handle heavy flows of strangers without degrading into those anonymous zones described 
by Newman. In fact, she posits they must do this if they are to be livable, a point that holds 
even more so in today’s increasingly multi-cultural milieus. In short, Newman seems to see 
cities as places of violence, danger and risk, and accordingly values defensibility above all, 
thus his emphasis on affordances organized around territoriality. By contrast, Jacobs over-
whelmingly celebrates cities as elaborate, often beautiful and nearly always intriguing ballets. 
She especially values community, diversity and what she would call “safety,” as opposed to 
Newman’s more soldierly emphasis on defense, which, according to Joy Knoblauch, essen-
tially replaces the “fortress apartment” and “hard walls and locks” with “a soft bunker, a 
network of defensible territories.”73 So although Newman’s defensible measures did reduce 
crime in some cases,74 it was not without social cost. From his standpoint, a neighborhood 
is in good order when residents recognize the people living on the block, and when, in his 
words, “strangers to the street are greeted by questioning glances and a cacophony of barking 
dogs.”75 Jacobs, by contrast, maintains that livable cities must be places where people are 
comfortable with strangers, and while unambiguous demarcation of public and private areas 
within neighborhoods is advised, she recommends ambiguous transition zones between 
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them, stressing the importance of drawing and welcoming people in, adding that crime 
tends to be worse with hard-bounded borders.
Accordingly, Jacobs does not merely hold that livable cities must be able to handle 
strangers, but rather that they become more livable by virtue of doing so. Strangers not only 
have the potential to increase safety by adding their eyes “to the number of effective eyes on 
the street”;76 they also add vibrancy, richness and aesthetic intrigue. Because of this—and 
because people like watching other people and are not much inclined to watch an empty 
street—the presence of people tends to invite more out, consequently increasing safety 
further, while also making for a more interesting milieu. For this reason, Jacobs sees advan-
tages in interspersing commercial establishments with residential dwellings. Commercial 
establishments “give people—both residents and strangers—concrete reasons for using the 
sidewalks on which these enterprises face.”77 “[T]he sight of [these] people attracts still other 
people”78 and therewith other observers. If the commercial enterprises vary enough, people 
may be present at all times. So, for example, while orthodoxy frowns on locating drinking 
establishments within residential areas, a bar can ensure the presence of people after other 
businesses have closed and most are in bed.
While the mixing of residential and commercial space is appealing for safety reasons 
and also to those preferring urban to suburban life, some enterprises interrupt flow and 
rarely combine well with urban residential space. For example, strip-malls, which cater 
mostly to the automobile, do little to bring people into the streets. Large malls such as 
the Eaton’s Centre in Toronto may have heavy pedestrian activity around their primary 
entrances, but areas between entrances are often dead, a situation, however, improved with 
the 2002 completion of the adjacent Dundas Square. Size is also a problem when it comes 
to organization of streets into blocks. Jacobs demonstrates that blocks arranged in long 
strips will concentrate traffic along certain routes, leaving other routes relatively bereft 
of people and the safety they offer. Lightly travelled routes are likely to have less business 
since it is typically difficult to thrive in low traffic areas. With fewer businesses, less people 
are drawn in, and so the cycle continues. “Most blocks,” writes Jacobs, “must be short; that 
is, streets and opportunities to turn must be frequent.”79 Another way to bring people out 
onto the sidewalks, as unnecessary as it might seem to say it, is to not actively discourage 
them. Whyte remarks that “[i]t is often assumed that children play in the street because 
they lack playground space. But many children play in the streets because they like to.”80 
If on the street, either in the company of a caregiver or with a caregiver keeping an eye on 
them from an apartment window or balcony, the streets have many more eyes on them and 
may actually be safer than parks, which sometimes lack natural surveillance. So in much 
the same way that the Kaplans advance an aesthetics of uncertainty, here an aesthetics of 
choice, which implies uncertainty, is at play, whether through the variety of commercial 
establishments and streets to walk on, or the power to use sidewalks as playgrounds. This 
translates into more interesting, engaging and fun environments, which must surely be 
considered in urban aesthetics.
This openness of the street also cultivates safety, albeit in predominantly gentle ways that 
rely less on police-like monitoring and more on people being out enjoying themselves. Here 
people are mostly not even aware they are monitoring, and this because they are not in 
fact doing so unless something goes wrong. The situation can accordingly be characterized 
along Heideggerian lines that suggest that things primarily become objects of contempla-
tion and explicit notice when they break down.81 Newman’s model, by contrast, is based on 
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heightening sensitivity to the fact—whether alleged or genuine—that things are bound to 
go wrong. As seen, therefore, it limits ways in and out of areas, reducing traffic and making 
outsiders feel conspicuous, in contrast to Jacobs’ approach, which augments the number 
of paths,82 intensifies pedestrian traffic and makes strangers feel welcome. As she sums up: 
“The safety of the street works best, most casually, and with least frequent taint of hostility 
or suspicion precisely where people are using and most enjoying the city streets voluntarily 
and are least conscious ... that they are policing,”83 in other words, when they do so pre- 
reflectively and only become aware they are doing so when a problem arises.
Though originally focused on information systems and human-computer interfaces, 
Value Sensitive Design researchers have begun examining urban settings and architecture, 
with at least one researcher, van den Hoven, specifically discussing Newman and Jacobs. He 
states that “[a]rchitects cannot but start from a social and moral requirement of well-being 
of future users,” and rightly adds that well-being can have many different meanings,84 and 
goes on to elaborate what the concept entails for Newman, Jacobs and others, listing a good 
number of the values just discussed. Yet surprisingly, his analysis lacks significant attention 
to implicit, largely unconscious background values or biases leading theorists to promote 
specific values such as defensibility, though he does show awareness of the issue, especially 
by virtue of the scholars he cites.
Take Newman as an example. Knoblauch observes that he was essentially an entrepre-
neur when producing his landmark work.85 As with researchers such as Paul Ekman, whose 
questionable conclusions on reading facial expressions86 have been lapped up by policing 
and security communities and propagated on television shows, Newman’s work was made 
for a lucrative market, in fact, more or less the same one. It presupposes Hobbesian and 
Darwinian notions that life is predominantly a struggle not to be attacked and to defend 
one’s territory. According to Knoblauch, moreover, it takes for granted classical liberal 
principles, naturalizing the concept of private property and the tenet, as Newman puts 
it, that “historically the intactness of the family living unit and the territorial zone of the 
cluster of family units has always been given architectural expression.”87 The publication of 
Newman’s major works also coincided with a time, like today, when politicians capitalized 
on emphasizing crime,88 and Newman prospered from this.
Knoblauch and others such as Neal Katyal and Shah and Kesan, taking a lead from 
Michel Foucault,89 accordingly maintain that Newman’s vision recalls “Jeremy Bentham’s 
aim for the panopticon” insofar as it endeavors to use the environment as a “means to 
produce peaceful, productive behaviour, avoiding the costs, abuses, and rebellions that 
come with overt policing.”90 Although this is not a repudiation of Newman’s empirical 
findings, which were carefully arrived at; and while accordingly not necessarily grounds 
for a wholesale rejection of his solutions, which sometimes worked and arguably remain 
more humane and broadly realizable than heavily compounded neighborhoods, it does 
suggest circumspection. Indeed, it suggests caution with any approach insofar as all design 
inevitably embodies personal, economic and cultural values of decision-makers, planners 
and architects—values that are often held nearly unconsciously. Langdon Winner sums up 
the situation, writing that
many of the most important examples of technologies that have political consequences are 
those that transcend the simple categories of “intended” and “unintended” altogether. These 
are instances in which the very process of technical development is so thoroughly biased in a 
particular direction that it regularly produces results counted as wonderful breakthroughs by 
136   M. CRIPPEN
some social interests and crushing setbacks by others. In such cases it is neither correct nor 
insightful to say, “Someone intended to do somebody else harm.” Rather, one must say that 
the technological deck has been stacked long in advance to favor certain social interests, and 
that some people were bound to receive a better hand than others.91
Along with other human artifacts, urban design and architecture are not neutral, but mani-
fest values that we barely notice because they are ingrained in our worlds and cultural habits. 
This invariably has the effect of elevating particular social groups and values above others.92
Leaving aside objections related to social control, entrepreneurial ambition, political 
opportunism or the fact that design implicitly and sometimes explicitly favors select groups, 
Whyte offers an additional warning: that “[p]laces designed with distrust [often] get what 
they [are] looking for.”93 He says he only ever observed one park with serious problems, and 
saw none in places well used. The exception was a park in which drug dealers began working. 
To discourage this, half the benches were removed and later steel-bar fences added. This 
drove away ordinary users, and therewith left the park more open to dealers and custom-
ers.94 Jacobs elaborates on other costs of excessively defensible space, comparing it to the 
system of turfs enforced by city gangs. With sharply defined perimeters, privately controlled 
grounds and streets, what are advertised as “islands within the city” can also function to 
demarcate turf and fence strangers out. She sums up by quoting a letter printed in the New 
York Post in 1959, which remains strikingly relevant:
The other day for the first time my pride at being a resident of Stuyvesant Town and New York 
City was replaced by indignation and shame. I noticed two boys about 12 years old sitting on 
a Stuyvesant Town bench. They were deep in conversation, quiet, well-behaved—and Puerto 
Rican. Suddenly two Stuyvesant Town guards were approaching—one from the north and one 
from the south. The one signaled the other by pointing at the two boys. One went up to the 
boys and after several words, quietly spoken on both sides, the boys rose and left. They tried 
to look unconcerned... How can we expect people to have any dignity if we rip it from them 
even before they reach adulthood? How really poor are we of Stuyvesant Town and of New 
York City, too, that we can’t share a bench with two boys.95
Aside from this moral shortcoming, places designed for mistrust are seldom appealing on 
an aesthetic or social level, especially if you are the subject of mistrust. This is something I 
often observe in Egypt where neighborhood compounds are the norm for the affluent, where 
security guards vet who gains entry into shopping malls, universities and other areas on the 
basis of race, perceived economic status and sometimes age. Problems extend beyond social 
discrimination, however. Both Jacobs and Newman stress the need to demarcate public 
from private. Yet for such a demarcation to occur, there must first be both public and private 
spheres of life, but disproportionate emphasis on private realms largely obliterates public 
spheres and therewith the possibility of a demarcation. As this distinction disintegrates, 
so too do the largely unconscious networks of mutual support. After all, while people care 
about what occurs on sidewalks outside their doors, an area outside a compound wall can 
be almost non-existent to awareness, pre-reflective or otherwise. A degree of ownership is 
inescapable and likely advised, but a good portion of it needs to be public if broadly liveable 
spaces are the aim.
IV. Thriving with biases
I will conclude by discussing some lessons and limitations. One particularly salient lesson 
is that preference and function can be counterintuitive. It is not uncommon to observe 
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stunningly beautiful areas that are not especially popular, as in the case of Strong Pond at 
Toronto’s York University or the lovely gardens at the American University in Cairo that fail 
to attract because they are outside major pedestrian areas. This reminds us that aesthetics, 
especially in urban spheres, is more complicated than sheer beauty or ugliness. Aesthetics 
operates on a subtler, more implicit but also pervasive level, especially if we take seriously 
the Kaplans’ position that aesthetic perception is an everyday way we negotiate and handle 
environments.
A second lesson that has reoccurred throughout is that cities are vastly tangled environ-
ments—pulsating, living ecologies with many scales, interconnections and “ever-increasing 
circles of complexity,”96 to borrow a phrase from Charles Darwin. Because of this complex-
ity, seemingly small decisions often have cascading effects and unintended consequences. 
Virtually all urban theorists ought to be sensitive to this issue by virtue of working in what 
broadly may be counted as environmental studies. That said, research progresses and avoids 
falling into incoherence by looking at a relatively small number of things in isolation. By the 
very nature of what academic research is, therefore, it risks moving away from approaches 
suitable to the investigation of cities. Although this article has offered only a sliver of what 
could be examined, I have tried to keep in mind that cities are physical, social and political 
animals, and considered scales ranging from immediate pre-reflective behavior in parks to 
the history that invested certain values and social affordances in urban structures. However, 
I have still ignored more than I have covered, and accordingly neglected critically important 
issues.
For instance, whereas the differentiation of a city into neighborhoods has consequences 
on immediate levels, some of which I addressed, it also has broad political ramifications, 
which I largely ignored. Jacobs identifies three scales of neighborhood and observes that 
each “has different functions but the three supplement each other in a complex fashion.”97 
Public money flows from the city as a whole, and is directed in various ways from the 
governing administration, which makes decisions for the entirety. At the other end of the 
spectrum are street neighborhoods, which are also political entities, and in the middle are 
districts of about 100,000 people or so. If residents in a neighborhood believe a proposed 
project is undesirable, it is often they who initially challenge it, whether through peti-
tions or local meetings. Jacobs recollects residents objecting to a proposal to remove three 
meters of sidewalk along a Greenwich Village street. The initial impetus against this came 
from the affected neighborhood. Though the protest began there, it was ultimately success-
ful through the power of district-wide organizations, without which it likely would have 
had little effect.98 For academic purposes, researchers might ignore the broader political 
inter-workings of these various scales of neighborhood, as indeed I have done. Yet when it 
comes to the concrete health of a city, this is nearsighted. If, for example, design were not to 
accommodate local political functioning, and if developers were consequently to gain more 
freedom to erect large shopping centers, then the very networks of unconscious support 
this paper advocates would be threatened.
A third lesson is that values, which might also be called biases, are inevitable. Newman 
and Jacobs had theirs. I have mine. However, biases are not always bad. A hypothesis, which 
narrows focus, is a bias; so too is a method, which in all cases excludes certain data ahead 
of time and organizes what remains according to its parameters, as when human behav-
iors are mapped onto discrete scales in order to accommodate experimental methods in 
psychology. So while typically frowned upon, we cannot conduct research without biases. 
138   M. CRIPPEN
Indeed, we cannot register anything without them. Even the human hand is a kind of bias 
that shapes much of our worldly experience, and technologies ranging from computers and 
smartphones to cars, doorknobs, chainsaws, elevators, pencils and books are thankfully 
designed to accommodate this bias. The theory of affordances in fact underscores the una-
voidability of biases insofar as it holds that we see things according to what we—with our 
particular bodies, capacities and needs—can do. For such reasons, Gibson explains—in a 
line of analysis so close to Dewey and Merleau-Ponty that it could have been lifted—that 
“an affordance is neither an objective property nor a subjective property; or it is both if 
you like.” It “cuts across the dichotomy of subjective–objective.” Gibson continues: “An 
affordance points both ways, to the environment and to the observer.”99 By pointing to 
observers, who must register things in terms of what they can do within a given setting, 
affordances emphasize perception as non-detached, so that, as Dewey puts it, “perception 
and its object are built up and completed in one and the same continuing operation.”100 This 
suggests perception is fruitfully biased, not in the sense of being in the head, but in the sense 
of being perspectival. We see things from our perspectives, that is, in terms of what we can 
do, which is inextricably linked and co-determined by what the environment enables us to 
do, so that our perspectives are as much thrust upon us by the environment as the reverse.
To develop this into a line of argument more relevant to this article, notice that possibili-
ties that are of extreme disinterest to us are not likely to show up as strong affordances insofar 
as we do not see them as options to be taken or avoided in the first place. Approaching 
this view, James stresses not only that we see things in terms of interests, but also that in 
the absence of them we would not see much at all since experience would degrade into 
chaos.101 If we did not have interests narrowing our attention during a lecture, and attended 
equally to every person, piece of clothing, fleck of dust, snatch of mud, piece of lint, whisper, 
background hum, rain pattering the window, fingers tapping keyboards, the hardness of 
our chair and scent of perfume or coffee in the room, in short, all perceptible aspects in 
the lecture hall, we would not take in what the speaker is saying, nor indeed have anything 
qualifying as coherent experience.102 For such reasons, James stresses the importance of 
interests. In so doing, he also emphasizes a kind of perspectival pluralism, which translates 
also to value pluralism. In one well-known example, he writes: “One man conceives [oil] 
as a combustible, another as a lubricator,” and still another “as a darkener of wood.”103 For 
different people, the substance is valued and consequently noted for producing different 
effects. James accordingly maintains that an object’s “essence”—that is, the key set of features 
that make something what it is—“varies with the end we have in view.”104 Hence essence is 
nothing more than those key properties that are
…so important for my interests that in comparison with [them] I may neglect the rest. … The 
properties which are important vary from man to man and from hour to hour. … But many 
objects of daily use—as paper, ink, butter, horse-car—have properties of such constant unwa-
vering importance, and have such stereotyped names, that we end by [erroneously] believing 
that to conceive them in those ways is to conceive them in the only true way. Those are no 
truer ways of conceiving them than any others; they are only more important ways, more 
frequently serviceable ways.105
This has some fairly obvious implications for the account delivered in this article. From this 
point of view we can see that some values—for instance, safety—are fairly constant across 
time and place and to that extent, essential. Others, such as diversity, vary with historical 
and cultural context, and others still with the individual. Thus while there are few instances 
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when planners will want to ignore safety, they will want to keep design open enough to 
accommodate significant variation of values in most cases if the aim is broadly liveable 
cities. This means incorporating choice into design.
On a very local and immediate level, choice is important from the standpoint of comfort. 
At different times, to consider a trivial case in point, park users may want to sit “up front, 
in back, to the side, in the sun, in the shade, in groups, off alone.”106 Women and men are 
often partial to different seating arrangements.107 People like flexibility, and Whyte observed 
that a person will “often move a chair a few inches this way and that before sitting in it, with 
the chair ending up about where it was in the first place.”108 Though insignificant in terms 
of physical position, these movements convey a message: “Sorry about the closeness, but 
there’s no room elsewhere, and I am going to respect your privacy, as you will mine.”109 To 
increase choice, flexible, multi-use design-features are advisable. Fences and low walls can 
be used to sit on, hang merchandise upon, or as backdrops for vending booths.110 Ledges can 
double as seats and thus increase the number of possible seating arrangements. People will 
sometimes sit on both sides of a ledge if it is wide enough to accommodate two backsides, 
and thus “for a few extra inches, builders can double the amount of sitting space.”111 People 
may not use all the space, but this is not the main point. “The benefit of the extra space is 
social comfort—more room for groups and individuals to sort themselves out,” and above 
all, “more choices and more perception of choices.”112
Leanne Rivlin, drawing on Gibson, states that “[a]ffordances enable the discovery of 
possibilities, an important dimension of public space that helps to satisfy people’s needs.”113 
She stresses freedom of choice in public life, which she says “is at the core of people’s ability 
to discover possibilities in the environment and thereby to make use of found spaces.”114 
This includes not just freedom to act, but to define a space, so that a fruit vendor or per-
former can become a locus that gathers people, making the place what it is, much in ways 
that Heidegger discusses when he talks about jugs and bridges doing the same.115 Squares, 
intersections, monuments, community gardens cultivated in abandoned lots similarly define 
areas geographically, and the people drawn in contribute to the uniqueness of the place 
and add to what it is.116
The demand for freedom of use has always been pressing insofar as individuals have 
always valued different things, with even the same individuals having different values at 
different times of the day, days of the week, periods of their lives, or depending on the com-
pany they are with. The demand has arguably become more pressing as cities have become 
increasingly multicultural and multi-social. It is unfortunate, then, as Nisha Fernando 
observes, that choice is increasingly threatened “through the privatization of urban public 
spaces, including sidewalks.”117 She notes that people sometimes have visual access to pub-
lic spaces, yet without physical admittance because of fences and such obstacles. Perhaps 
more troubling is the extent to which control is mandated through bylaws and other reg-
ulations. A case in point is Toronto, one of the most multicultural and liberal cities in the 
world, yet, like so many other places in the West, highly regulated, so that it was considered 
“food history” when, in 2011, a vendor won the right to sell fare other than hotdogs and 
sausages;118 or when in 2012, vendors generally were granted the right to do the same;119 
or where buskers must pay, apply, be photographed and follow a list of very specific rules 
in order to perform.120
Indeed, while countries such as Myanmar and Egypt are oppressed when it comes to 
expression of political and religious ideologies, they have greater liberties than Western 
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regions when it comes to many immediate personal choices, such as management of time 
and small economies. There food vendors more or less sell what they want where they want 
to sell it without or regardless of permit requirements; and while many practices would send 
Western health inspectors screaming, consumers can use their judgment and take some 
responsibility for what they put in their mouths. The fact is, moreover, that I have never 
gotten sick from street food in either country despite an extensive visit to one and residing 
in the other for roughly six years, and despite not being particularly discriminating about 
what goes in my mouth. Although it is true that these countries would benefit from adopting 
certain Western practices, the reverse also holds. This is perhaps one more value—openness 
to other cultures and to the fact that we are not always right—that might fruitfully prosper 
in design and policy, which are inextricably intertwined.
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